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Models of durable goods with network externalities that set instantaneously have emphasized that
a monopolist selling those goods has too high an incentive to introduce new vintages of the durable
good, to make previous vintages (already bought by consumers) obsolete. This is referred to as planned
obsolescence. We examine the robustness of planned obsolescence to the inclusion of network externalities
that set in with a lag. If externalities set in with a lag (however small), consumers have an incentive to
wait for other consumers to adopt the new vintage ﬁrst, and in the absence of any change in prices, that
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Combining the two types of incentives we show that the monopolist is able to overcome consumer’s
inertia and still generate planned obsolescence through both intratemporal and intertemporal price dis-
crimination. However, if monopoly power is “short lived” (for example due to copying), we show that,
depending on the parameters of the model, we could have both types of ineﬃciencies: planned obsoles-
cence or delay. Delay is brought about because copying limits the ability of the monopolist to increase
prices in the future and therefore gives consumers an incentive to wait for both the onset of the (lagged)
externality eﬀect and the reduction in price caused by copiers. Delay appears mainly when the externality
eﬀect is strong and the new vintage is a signiﬁcant improvement over the existing durable good.
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11 Introduction
Models of durable goods with network externalities that set instantaneously have emphasized that a monop-
olist selling those goods has too high an incentive to introduce new vintages of the durable good, to make
previous vintages (already bought by consumers) obsolete. This is referred to as planned obsolescence. We
examine the robustness of planned obsolescence to the inclusion of network externalities that set in with
al a g(lagging externalities). Combining the two types of incentives we show that the monopolist is able
to overcome consumer’s inertia and still generate planned obsolescence through both intratemporal and in-
tertemporal price discrimination. However, if monopoly power is “short lived” (for example due to copying),
we show that, depending on the parameters of the model, we could have both types of ineﬃciencies: planned
obsolescence or delay. Delay is brought about because copying limits the ability of the monopolist to increase
prices in the future and therefore gives consumers an incentive to wait for both the onset of the (lagged)
externality eﬀect and the reduction in price caused by copiers. Delay appears mainly when the externality
eﬀect is strong and the new vintage is a signiﬁcant improvement over the existing durable good.
We introduce lagging externalities (instead of the more commonly used contemporaneous externalities)
when analyzing durable goods with two motivations in mind.1 First, we can think of network externalities
arising in durable goods not because of the presence of any physical interconnection (as in the case of the
choice of a telecommunications standard), but because of the need of a support base for those durables, that
becomes more accessible as the number of users of a particular model increases. If we think that there are
some frictions or inertia in this support industry, then the result is a lagged adjustment to the movements in
the user base of the downstream durable good. These kind of indirect network externalities arise, for example,
in car sales and their corresponding network of repair shops; or computer platforms are the corresponding
availability of software titles compatible with them, or in microprocessors and the availability of software
that can use all its capabilities.2
Another motivation for the use of lagging externalities considers the importance for many consumer
products and capital goods on the availability of information and experience of use (learning by using). A
product with a bigger user base would make it easier for someone using a particular model to ﬁnd someone
else with the same model and be able to get some information about his experience of use of that product. If
we consider that the development and transmission of knowledge takes some time, then it seems appropriate
to consider lagging instead of contemporaneous externalities. An example of this kind of indirect network
externality is the use of a particular word processing or spreadsheet software: the utility one gets out of a
particular brand of word processor depends not only on the number of users to which one can exchange ﬁles
(a contemporaneous eﬀect), but also on how easy one can ﬁnd a fellow user to work out some “bugs” in the
1We are not the ﬁrst to use the notion of lagged externalities. They appear, for example, in Durlauf (1991, 1993), Gale
(1995) and Adser` a and Ray (1998) although in a diﬀerent context.
2An example from the computer industry is the appearanceo ft h ePentium MMX processor, whichi n cluded a special set of
instructions to improve multimedia applications. A general complaint at the time of its appearance was the lack of software that
co u l du s ea l lt h en e wc apabilities of the MMX chip:“ The last time Intel added new instructions for its major PC microprocessor
line was two years ago, when it introduced the Pentium MMX chip. MMX stands for multimedia extensions, and software
developers eventually took advantage of the new hookst od e velop software with better graphics and sound.”[ N ewY ork Times,
Jan. 14th, 1999]
The same convenienceo fh a ving new software was observe da tt h et i m eo ft h ea p p e a r a n ceo ft h ePentium III processor:“ I f
you are running the same old software it doesn’td om u chf o ry o u .It’s a little faster than the Pentium II 450”. Linley Gwennap
(Microprocessor Report) on the Pentium III chip. [NewY ork Times, Feb. 24,1 9 9 9 ]. “[People]k now that to takef u l la d vantage
of a Pentium III machine, they will havet obuy new software.”[ N ewY ork Times, Jan. 14th, 1999]. However, industry analysts
recognized the usual delay for developers of new software:“ [ T]he software that will fully exploit the parallel processing power
of the [Pentium III’s] new instructions is going to dribble out over the next year. Byt h et i m es u chs o f t ware is widely available,
perhaps six months from now,a n dbyt h et i m eacritical mass of Internet Web sites have set up new features to takea d vantage
of the added power, Intel will haves witched to a new manufacturing process that will greatly increase the speed of future
Pentium III’s well beyond the current levels.”[ N ewY ork Times, March 4th, 1999].
2program (which depends on the whole history of use of that brand).
However, as Rosenberg (1982) has pointed out, this learning eﬀect can also arise in the feedback provided
from users to producers, and can take signiﬁcant time to develop.3. This eﬀect not only inﬂuences the
development of new products, but also aﬀects the utility derived from the use of existing durable goods, for
example, because of cost savings in maintenance or the discovery of “bugs” that force product recalls. These
cost savings in maintenance are apparently very important in the aircraft industry4, but also in electricity
production in steam power plants.5 In the case of the computer industry, this eﬀect is also important and
can beneﬁt existing users of a software through free “add-ons” that correct for bugs in earlier versions.6
The second justiﬁcation for the use of lagging externalities is more theoretical. We can consider exter-
nalities arising not only from the current size of the user base for a particular durable good, but also from
the history of use of that product. Thus, to model the importance of the externality associated with a
particular model, we can consider a general distributed scheme of its present and past use. We view the
use of contemporaneous externalities as an assumption that puts all the weight in one of the extremes: the
history of use is of no importance at all. What we propose here is to take the alternative view and test how
sensitive the results of the typical model are to the choice of the timing of the externalities one uses in the
model.
The main question of the paper will then be: Does a monopoly producing durable goods introduces
new models too fast to make vintages already in the market obsolete? This question derives from casual
observation about the reliability of durable goods, or the sometimes too fast perceived pace of introduction
of “improved” versions of the good.7
As we will see in the next section, the literature focused ﬁrst on the question of optimal durability and
the incentives of a monopolist supplying durable goods. The question of planned obsolescence is slightly
3“[...] in an economy with complex new technologies, there are essential aspects of learning that are a function not of
the experiencei n volved in producing the product, but of its utilization by the ﬁnal user. This is particularly important in
that case of capital goods. [...] in more general terms, the performance characteristics of a durable capital good often cannot
be understood until after prolonged experience with it. [...]C losely related to this is the factt h a to p t i m a ls e r vicing and
maintenance characteristics can be determined only after extensiveu s e—in many cases, only after many years.”[ Rosenberg
(1982), pp. 122—123]
4“During the operation of a new aircraft, operating cost reductions depend heavily upon learning more about the performance
characteristicso ft h es y s t e ma n dcomponents, and therefore upon understanding more clearly the full potential (as well as
potential bugs), of a new design. For example, it is only through extensive usage that detailed knowl e d g ei sg a i n e da bout engine
operation, maintenance needs, minimum servicing and overhaul requirements, and so on.”[ Rosenberg (1982)p .1 25]
“Int h ecase of the jet engine, [the interval between complete overhauls]w as originally based on the experience with recipro-
cating engines and was extended as experience was gained. [...]w hereas the airlines had overhauled piston engines after 2,000
to 2,500 hours of service, after some years of experience with the jet engines the time interval between overhauls was as high as
8,000 hours.”[ p. 130]
5See the discussion in Rosenberg (1982), p. 136.
6“The development of eﬀectives o f t ware is highly dependent upon user experience. The modiﬁcation of software systems
in response to this experiencei sn o w intrinsic to software engineering. This is so because most software products permit
wide va r i a t i o n si ni n p u t sa n dp r o cessing options. These options cannot possibly be tested completely prior to the release of
software. Thus, the optimal design of software depends upon a ﬂow of information from its customers. Furthermore, many
computer companies routinely provide extensives o f t ware support that involves software modiﬁcation when bugs are discovered
by customers —as they inevitably are—w hen the softwa r ei su s e d .T h ee ﬀ e ctiveness of support services in improving the product
after its release appears to be very important to the competitives u ccess of computer ﬁrms.”[ Rosenberg (1982), p. 139].T h i s
type of user feedback is explicitly used for example by Netscape and its “Netscape feedback agent” that automatically prompts
the user to send feedback to Netscape’s web site after any unexpected malfunction in the program.
7“They don’tm a kea u t o s ,[...]w hichl a s ta swe l la st h e yd i di nf a t h e r ’sd a y !” is a phrase cited in Swan (1972) as an example
of the conventional wisdom on the subject. Bulow (1986)a l s ocites John Kaplan about book revisions:“ I f an intelligent person
is revising his textbook,d oy o ut h i n k he’s going to redo it in suchaway that you can use the old version.?” Noticeh o wever,
that there is a qualitative diﬀerence between the two statements. In the ﬁrst one, there is an issue of reduced durability,i n
the sense that the new durable to be introduced in the market will facen ocompetition from the older version. In the second
statement, the problem is planned obsolescence: when the supplier decides to introducean e wv ersion of the durable, the old
model is still around in the market, and in principle can still beu s e d( m a y be less eﬃciently) to perform the task for whichi t
was sold.
3diﬀerent, since at the time the monopolist is deciding on introducing a new model into the market, the
old version is still being used, and in eﬀect, the monopolist competes with himself. With contemporaneous
externalities, Waldman (1993) and Choi (1994) show that a monopolist will have an incentive to introduce
new models in the market too fast, in order to make the existing models obsolete and induce old consumers
in the market to scrap their old durables and buy again the new models. Thus, in equilibrium, there is
planned obsolescence.
With lagging externalities, the situation is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. The monopolist still has incentives
to introduce new models very fast, to extract the old consumer’s surplus again. However, the presence of
lagging externalities, as in Ruiz (1997), creates an incentive for consumers to delay their adoption of a new
model. The intuition is the following: since it takes one period for any change in the number of users to be
reﬂected in the proﬁtability of using a model, then when old consumers are considering a switch to a new
model they have an incentive to let others go ﬁrst and build up the externality associated with this new
model8. We have two opposing forces on the two sides of the market, and in principle we could have any
outcome depending on the parameters of the model. However, as we show in the ﬁrst part, for all parameter
conﬁgurations, the eﬀect of the consumer side (delay) is weaker than the eﬀect of the supply side (too early
introduction of a new vintage). Thus, in equilibrium, there is never delay, and in some cases there is still
planned obsolescence as in the previous literature with contemporaneous externalities.
As stated before, the situation changes if we allow a competitive fringe to copy the new vintage and
supply it at marginal cost one period after its introduction by the monopolist. In that case, consumers will
exercise their option to wait since now prices will never increase in the following periods. This generates
both planned obsolescence or ineﬃcient delay depending on the parameters of the model, something that
cannot occur if externalities are contemporaneous.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the previous literature on
optimum durability and planned obsolescence. Section three presents the basic model. Section four presents
the equilibrium outcome in the case of a monopolist, depending on the parameters of the model. Section
ﬁve shows the socially optimum outcome and compares it with the market solution. Section six introduces
the competitive fringe that can copy and sell any vintage one period after it has been introduced and again
compares the equilibrium outcome with the planners solution, which is the same as in section ﬁve. Section
seven concludes with some general comments
2 Related Literature
The literature on planned obsolescence as such is relatively new, although it is closely related to the literature
on the optimal durability of a durable good produced by a monopolist. One of the ﬁrst formal models of
planned durability was Swan (1972). In that model, Swan argued that since the monopolist can control two
8In the example of the newb rand of car, an old consumer doesn’t want to be the ﬁrst one to giveu pt h ewell developed
repair shop network for his old model in order to buy a new model that still doesn’th a vet h a tn e t work today (although he
knowsi twill have it in the future). Further, even if everyone else switches to a newv intage, he might as well wait for one
period with his old model (still enjoying a good service) and then switch one period later than the rest of buyers, when the
repair shops for the new model have had time to develop.
Rosenberg (1976), for example, states that “[o]n the purely technological level, innovations in their early stages are usu-
ally exceedingly ill-adapted to the wi d er a n g eo fm o r es p e cialized uses to whicht h e ya r ee ventually put. Potential buyers
may postpone purchase to await the elimination of “bugs” or the inevitable ﬂow of improvements in productp e r f o r m a n ceo r
characteristics.”
The same kind of reasoning is put forwa r di nt h eca s eo fm i croprocessors and software:“ E xperienced PC users havea l s o
learned that it is wise to wait a few months after any new technology, hardware or software, is ﬁrst put on sale. [...] Remember,
the early bird gets the bugs as well as the worm”[ N ewY ork Times, March 4th, 1999]
4variables, price and durability9, price will be used to extract the maximum consumer surplus, and durability
will be set at the optimum level to minimize the cost of any ﬂow of services from a stock of durable goods.
This apparently closed the discussion about the existence of too low durability coming from a monopolist
producing durable goods.
However, Bulow (1986) noted that the monopolist’s pricing policy faces a time inconsistency problem:
rational consumers anticipating that the monopolist will lower the price tomorrow to capture part of the
residual demand from today’s monopolistic price will restrain from buying today. The basic problem of the
monopolist is that it cannot credibly commit to a constant price over time, and that lack of commitment
hurts him.
In particular, one of the problems of the monopolist producing a durable good is the presence of a
proportion of the goods sold in the ﬁrst period that are carried over to the second. The monopolist, when
making his decisions about whether to reduce his price or not in the second period, does not take into
account the eﬀect on the buyers in the ﬁrst period, thus “ﬂooding the market” and lowering the price too
much, something the ﬁrst-period consumers rationally anticipate.
However, one of the mechanisms the monopolist can use to escape from this “time inconsistency” trap
is to manipulate the durability of the good away from the optimal (cost-minimizing) level: by reducing the
durability of the good, the monopolist reduces the volume of the used goods present in the second period,
and thus the negative externality on consumers is lower (and so is the time inconsistency problem). A similar
point is made by Rust (1986) in the context of a second-hand market for durables and endogenous scrappage
values for old durables.
All these models, while trying to incorporate the decision of killing the stock of the used good, focus on
the durability dimension of the product. As Bulow (1986) already pointed out:
“... planned obsolescence is much more than a matter of durability; it is also and perhaps
primarily about how often a ﬁrm will introduce a new product, and how compatible the new
product will be with older versions.”
With this in mind, Waldman (1993) develops a model where the monopolist does not choose durability,
but whether or not to introduce a new product that is incompatible with the good already used in the
market. Compatibility is important because there exists contemporaneous network externalities attached
to each version of the product. A model by Choi (1994) addresses the same issues, but it also allows the
monopolist to choose whether or not the new product will be compatible with the old one. The basic result
in these two papers is very similar to the previous result on durability: the monopolist has an incentive to
introduce new versions of the good too fast in order to make the existing versions obsolete, and thus induce
consumers who already bought the product to buy again and so extract their consumer surplus twice.
These two papers, however, use contemporaneous externalities, and also allow consumers to coordinate
on the Pareto superior equilibrium of the game, which tends to bias their result towards new products
being taken by consumers very rapidly. We believe these models tend to suﬀer from the appearance of
equilibria that are sustained by self-fulﬁlling expectations, as in Krugman (1991). The introduction of
lagged externalities seem in the context of durable goods not only natural (as emphasized in the previous
9It was not until the model by Choi (1994) and Waldman (1993) that a formal distinction is made between durability and
obsolescence, although Swan (1972)a n dl a t e rBulow (1986) already hinted that the two concepts were not exactly equivalent.
5section) but it also rescues the importance of history in conditioning the equilibrium outcome of a game with
payoﬀ externalities, as emphasized by Adsera and Ray (1994) and Ruiz (1997).
3M o d e l
Consider a model of three periods t ∈{ 0,1,2}. There exists a monopolist with constant marginal costs c of
producing any of two vintages of a durable good, indexed by x ∈{ A,B}. Up to period 0 this monopolist
could only produce and sell vintage A, but starting from period 1 he can also produce and sell vintage B
at the same time. In period 0, there is a continuum of consumers with mass N who own vintage A of the
durable good. Henceforth these will be referred to as “old consumers,” who live until period 2. In period 1,
a mass N of new consumers arrive without the good and live also until period 2.
We assume that externalities s e ti nw i t hal a g(as in Ruiz 1997). In particular, it takes one period for a
change in the number of users of a particular vintage to aﬀect the utility of using that vintage. Formally,
if nxt is the mass of consumers using vintage x ∈{ A,B} in period t ∈{ 0,1,2}, then the payoﬀ of using
a durable good of vintage x in period t is given by f(x)+nx,t−1. The ﬁrst term is just the “stand-alone”
utility f(.) derived from that vintage, whereas the second term is the lagged externality eﬀect. Consumers
without a durable good get a utility of zero.
To make the analysis simple, we assume that the two vintages A and B are incompatible. This means that
we are assuming away any compatibility decisions, although the monopolist can always decide to continue
producing the old vintage A, which is completely compatible with that currently used by consumers in period
0. We assume no discounting and
c<f(A) <f(B)( 1 )
which has two direct implications. First, from the social point of view it is always better to produce at
least one of the vintages of the durable good, since the stand-alone beneﬁt of having the good outweighs its
production costs. Second, (1) implies that the new vintage B coming on the market is intrinsically better
than the older one.
3.1 Timing and Strategies
In periods 1 and 2, the monopolist decides which prices to set for each vintage during that period. We allow
the monopolist to discriminate between current users of diﬀerent vintages, for example by letting consumers
of vintage A trade their used durable goods if they decide to buy model B. Thus, for each period and
model, the monopolist speciﬁes two (possibly equal) prices.10 We will therefore denote by psx the regular
price for vintage x ∈{ A,B} in period s ∈{ 1,2}. Accordingly, pt
sx will be the trade-in price for vintage x in
period s. Notice, however, that in period 1, consumers still do not have model B so there is no possibility
of trading model B for model A. This eliminates pt
2A from the strategy set of the monopolist. Each period,
after observing the monopolist pricing scheme for that period, consumers decide which vintage to adopt.
The sequence of moves is summarized in ﬁgure (1)
We will look for the subgame perfect equilibria of this game. However, given the presence of externalities
at the consumer level, there is a (potential) problem of multiplicity of equilibria, driven by expectations about
10Of course, the monopolist has to takei n t oa ccount the possibility of arbitrage between the two diﬀerent groups charged
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Figure 1: Sequence of moves
other consumer’s actions. Where this problem arises, we will assume, as in Katz and Shapiro (1986) and
most of the literature thereafter, that agents can coordinate on their Pareto-optimal equilibrium strategy11.
4 The Monopolist’s Problem
As stated before, for each period the monopolist has set prices for each vintage. Since we are looking for
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, we will work backwards from the second period, taking into account any
possible histories up to period 1.
The history of the game up to period 1 can be expressed in terms of prices set by the monopolist or in
terms of vintages used by old and new consumers. For the remainder of the paper it will be more useful to
take these second approach. At the beginning of period 1, the history of the game is just the tuple {A,Ø}
where the ﬁrst component is the vintage used by old consumers and Ø in the second component represents
that no vintage was used by the old consumers. At the beginning of period 2, there are six possible histories:
{{A,Ø},{w,y}} where w ∈{ A,B} is the vintage used by old consumers in period 1 and y ∈{ A,B,Ø} is the
vintage used by new customers in that ﬁrst period.12
4.1 Second Period Decision
There are six possible histories in the second period. Since the common component {A,Ø} will play no role
in the second period, we will just denote each of the possible six histories by the outcome of the ﬁrst period:
{w,y}, where w ∈{ A,B} and y ∈{ A,B,Ø}.
Table 1 summarizes the possible histories in period 1 and the corresponding maximum second period
monopoly prices that induce a purchase by consumers, extracting the maximum surplus from them. Of
course, since this is the last period, the monopolist will never try to induce a purchase setting second period
11Note however, that as in Adsera and Ray (1998), the use of lagging externalities signiﬁcantly reduces the set of equilibria
as compared with the case of contemporaneous externalities. Inf a ct, multiplici t yi se l i m i n a t e di nconsumer’s choice in period
2.
12Note that even with assumption (1) the monopolist may successfully prevent the newcomers from buying any model in
period 1 by the appropriate choice of trade-in prices targeted to old consumers. In particular, he can always set a ridiculously
high regular pricea n da n“aﬀordable” trade-in price.
7prices below marginal cost c. Therefore c constitutes the lower bound on any equilibrium second period
price set by the monopolist. The maximum price the monopolist can charge to each group depends on each
consumer’s outside option, which in most cases is equal to the payoﬀ they would have received by keeping
the same vintage they had in period 1. The only exception to this are histories {A,Ø} and {B,Ø} where new
consumers have not used any vintage yet, and therefore have zero reservation utility. Note that in each case
the prices that can be charged each group of consumers are independent of the actions of the other group
(or even of the actions of other consumers of the same group). The reason is that externalities are lagging,
so any change in the number of users today will not aﬀect the utility derived from the use of a particular
vintage today, and since this is the last period, it will not matter at all.13
Note that given the strategy of the monopolist in the second period, consumers are indiﬀerent between
buying that vintage or not. These prices represent the limit of prices set to make consumers strictly prefer
that particular vintage. The monopolist’s price strategy also includes prices which do not strictly correspond
with the history of the game. For example, if in the ﬁrst period both types of consumers are using model A
(i.e. history (A,A) in the table), the monopolist still has to specify a regular price p2B and a trade-in price
pt
2B for vintage B. This takes into account out-of-equilibrium strategies on the part of consumers in period
1.
In order to understand the contents of table 1, it would be useful to review some of its entries. For example,
if old consumers kept their durable good A in period 1 and new consumers acquired also that vintage we
are in the ﬁrst row of table 1 (outcome (A,A) in the ﬁrst period). In the second period, the monopolist will
extract the maximum surplus from all consumers. In period 2, vintage A enjoys an externality eﬀect of 2N
(the number of users of that vintage in period 1), so if period 1 customers keep vintage A they will get a
utility ﬂow in period 2 equal to f(A)+2N. Even if all decide to change to vintage B each one would only get
utility f(B) in that period. Therefore, the maximum trade-in price the monopolist can set for vintage B in
this subgame is f(B)−f(A)−2N. Of course, it needs to be checked that this price is not below marginal cost,
and therefore pt
2B = Max{f(B)−f(A)−2N,c}. Notice that if pt
2B = c>f(B)−f(A)−2N then consumers
will not trade-in their vintage A in exchange for vintage B. If a consumer shows up without any vintage to
trade in and wants to buy vintage A, the monopolist can extract all the surplus generated by that vintage
in period 2 since that consumer has no outside option. Therefore p2A = Max{f(A)+2 N,c} = f(A)+2 N
from assumption (1) . If that consumer wants to buy vintage B, it will be willing to pay only up to
p2B = Max{f(B),c} = f(B), again keeping no consumer surplus in period 2. If there is a consumer in
period 2 that already has model B and wants to have model A, it will not be willing to pay p2A = f(A)+2N
since now his outside option is to keep model B and enjoy a second period consumer surplus equal to f(B).
Therefore, the monopolist will have to oﬀer a trade-in price pt
2A = Max{f(A) − f(B)+2 N,c}. Therefore,
the monopolist has two possible second-period outcomes to choose from for this subgame: (B,B)i fh es e l l s
vintage B to both groups or (A,A) if he decides not to sell to anyone. The same type of restriction applies
to the case where both groups own vintage B in the second period (fourth line in table 1).
Notice that in the derivation of optimal prices and the equilibrium behavior of consumers we have not
assumed that consumers coordinate their purchases. This assumption, which is common in the literature, is
needed in the case of contemporaneous externalities. With contemporaneous externalities a change in the
number of users today aﬀects the utility of the durable good in the same period. With lagging externalities,
a change in the user base today does not aﬀect today’s payoﬀs, and therefore there is a unique equilibrium
13Note however, that when we analyzet h ep r i cing scheme for the ﬁrst period, actions in the current period still do not aﬀect
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Table 1: Feasible actions in the second period and associated proﬁt-maximizing prices
in the second period.
Consumers will buy a vintage diﬀerent than the one they are using only if the price is less than or equal
than the utility derived in period 2 from that vintage. Looking at table 1 we can see that in histories {A,B},
{B,A}, {B,B} and {B,Ø} consumers will not trade in model A for model B as the price necessary for
consumers to be willing to exchange vintage is below marginal cost c14.
After eliminating cases where trade-in prices would have to be below marginal cost, the possible alter-
natives for the monopolist in the second period and their associated proﬁts for that period (π2) are given
in table 2. The only diﬀerence between second period outcomes in table 2 and those of table 1 is in history
{B,Ø}. Notice that if the monopolist arrives to the second period without selling to new consumers, then it is
more proﬁtable to sell them model B than model A (p2B = f(B)+N>p 2A = f(A)) so the monopolist will
induce outcome (B,B) in the second period, rather than (B,A). Of course the speciﬁc choice of (behavioral)
strategy for this period will depend on the relationship between the parameters c, N, f(A)a n df(B). Note
in particular that if the monopolist has already sold any vintage to new consumers in the ﬁrst period (the
ﬁrst four histories), it may be optimal not to sell again to any group in the second period, specially if the
improvement embodied in the new vintage (the diﬀerence f(B) − f(A)) is low relative to the marginal cost
of production c.
If we are to establish the monopolist’s equilibrium strategy for period 2, we need to take into account
14Actually, given that weh a ve made no assumptions about the relationship between c, N and f(B) − f(A), we can only
eliminate those cases that yield negativep r i ces in the second period. Note however, that later on we will allow prices in the




Second period outcomes (old cons., new cons.)
and associated second period proﬁts
A,A




(B,B) π2 =( f(B) − f(A) − c)N
B,A
(B,A) π2 =0
(B,B) π2 =( f(B) − f(A) − c)N
B,B (B,B) π2 =0
A,Ø
(A,A) π2 =( f(A)+N − c)N
(A,B) π2 =( f(B) − c)N>0
(B,A) π2 =( f(B) − 2c)N
(B,B) π2 =( 2 f(B) − f(A) − N − 2c)N
B,Ø (B,B) π2 =( f(B)+N − c)N>0
Table 2: Undominated outcomes in second period and associated second period monopoly proﬁts
not only prices for consumers on the equilibrium path, but also optimal prices oﬀ the equilibrium path (for
example, if a consumer arrives without having bought a vintage in period 1). The discussion in this section
can be summarized in the following
Proposition 1 Given a history in period 2:{{A,Ø},{w,y}} where w ∈{ A,B} and y ∈{ A,B,Ø},t h e r e
exists a unique equilibrium in the subgame starting in period 2. Equilibrium prices and outcomes are given
by table 3. Equilibrium prices are such that the monopolist is able to extract all consumer surplus (except for
each consumer’s outside option of keeping the vintage they used in period 1).
Proof. Straightforward computations from table 2.
4.2 First Period Decision
In the ﬁrst period, the monopolist has six possible strategies to choose from, depending on whether it wants
to sell vintage B to the old consumers or not, and whether it wants to sell vintage A, B, or he does not want
to sell any durable good to the newcomers. We analyze in detail each of the possible subgames that can be
opened in period 1.
For this ﬁrst period, we still have the same multiplicity of equilibria that arises in models with contem-
poraneous externalities.15 We will therefore assume that, given the prices set by the monopolist, consumers
15Suppose for example that prices in the ﬁrst period are p1A and p1B for vintages A and B, respectively. Ifa l lconsumers (new
and old) decide to use vintage A, we will haveo u t come (A,A) in the ﬁrst period (ﬁrst line in table 3). A newc onsumer who
goes along with all the rest of his cohort and buys A gets total utility in the twop e r i o d se qual to 2f(A)+3N −p1A, irrespective
of the twop o s s i ble equilibrium outcomes in period 2. Ifh ed e viates and buys B he would get total utility 2f(B) − p1B in the
two periods. Thus, he would buy A as long as
p1B − p1A > 2(f(B) − f(A)) − 3N (2)
On the other hand, if everyone decides to buy vintage B in the ﬁrst period (outcome (B,B), fourth line in table 3), then
an e wc onsumer that followsh i scohort gets total utility 2f(B) +2 N − p1B. Deviating and buying A in the ﬁrst period gives
utility 2f(A) − p1A. He would therefore buy A as long as
p1B − p1A > 2(f(B) − f(A)) +2 N (3)
Comparing (2)a n d( 3 )we can see that there is a range of prices for which weh a ve at least twoe quilibria, depending on the
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Table 3: Equilibrium in period 2
11coordinate on their Pareto-preferred equilibrium.
Notice that from the previous proposition, the monopolist in period 2 is able to extract any additional
surplus that a consumer may obtain by an exchange of vintage. Therefore, a consumer in period 2 will
get the utility of keeping the same vintage he has in period 1, irrespective of the exchange made with the
monopolist in that period. We proceed to analyze each particular subgame that opens in period 1.
4.2.1 Subgame (A,A):S e l lv i n t a g eA to new consumers
The monopolist decides to sell vintage A to the new customers in the ﬁrst period. In the second period he
cannot tell old and new consumers apart by means of trade-in prices since they start with the same vintage.
From table 3, the monopolist will sell vintage B to both types of consumers if and only if
f(B) − f(A) > 2N + c (4)
otherwise, in equilibrium, he won’t sell any product in the second period.
If (4) is satisﬁed then consumers know that in the second period they will be induced to abandon good
A and switch to B. When trading vintage B for vintage A in the second period, they will keep a consumer
surplus in that period equal to f(B) − pt
2B = f(A)+2 N. The monopolist can charge in the ﬁrst period
a price for vintage A equal to the consumer surplus of both periods, which is equal to the utility of using
vintage A during the two periods. Note that in the second period these consumers realize the externalities
of a group of size 2N, which means p1A =2 f(A)+3 N>c .Total proﬁts for the whole subgame are thus
equal to (p1A − c)N + π2 =( 2 f(B) − N − 3c)N.
On the other hand, if (4) is not satisﬁed, then in the second period the monopolist will choose not to sell
vintage B to those consumers who already have vintage A (the necessary trade-in price to induce a purchase
would be below marginal cost). The price that he can set for vintage A in the ﬁrst period is still the utility
generated by that vintage in the two periods p1A =2 f(A)+3N. In this case, total proﬁts in the two periods
will be equal to proﬁts generated in the ﬁrst period: (2f(A)+3 N − c)N.
Finally, in order to prevent new consumers from buying vintage B, the monopolist will have to set a price
in the ﬁrst period p1B bigger than 2f(B)+N, which is the total consumer surplus obtained from vintage B
in the two periods if all new consumers coordinate on buying that vintage in period 1.16
Therefore, total proﬁts in the two periods are:
πAA =
 
(2f(B) − N − 3c)N. if f(B) − f(A) > 2N + c (outcome {(A,A),(B,B)})
(2f(A)+3 N − c)N otherwise (outcome {(A,A),(A,A)}) (5)
In order to sustain this subgame in equilibrium, we also need to set up regular and trade-in prices for vintage
B to discourage consumers from switching to it:
p1A =2 f(A)+3 N
p1B > 2f(B)+2 N
pt
1B > 2f(B) − 2f(A)
(6)
Notice that with these prices, an old consumer does not want to trade vintage B for A since any surplus gain
will be appropriated by the monopolist through pt
1B. If all consumers decide to switch to vintage B, then
16Reca l lt h a ti nt h es e cond period, this consumer will only get a surplus equal to f(B) + N if all newc onsumers decided to
adopt vintage B in period 1. Any trade in the second period will have the monopolist extracting any consumer surplus above
this level.
12old and new consumers would get a surplus in the two periods equal to 2f(B)+2 N. If old consumers keep
vintage A they are assured a consumer surplus of 2f(A)+2 N. If pt
1B ≥ 2f(B) − 2f(A) then old consumers
are better oﬀ keeping vintage A even if all consumers coordinate a switch to vintage B. New consumers
weakly prefer to buy vintage A and get zero surplus rather than buying vintage B and obtaining negative
surplus. The regular prices p1A and p1B ensure that new consumers will choose to buy vintage A. Note also
that if new consumers want to acquire vintage B buying vintage A ﬁrst and then trading it in, they will
pay a total price p1A + pt
1B > 2f(B)+3 N>p 1B. Thus new consumers do not want to acquire vintage B
through this double buying.
4.2.2 Subgame (A,B):S e l lv i n t a g eB to new consumers
In this subgame the monopolist sells the improved version of the durable (B) only to new consumers in the
ﬁrst period, but sets a price that prevents old consumers from upgrading to B. In the second period, the
monopolist will also sell vintage B to old consumers if and only if
f(B) − f(A) >c (7)
New consumers know that they will never be induced to change to vintage A in period 2 (see table
3). Given that they will keep vintage B, new consumers in the ﬁrst period will be willing to pay up to
p1B =2 f(B)+N. This is true regardless of what old consumers do: since externalities are lagging, what
happens in period 2 does not aﬀect the utility derived from using vintage B in period 2.
Therefore proﬁts in the ﬁrst period are always equal to (2f(B)+N−c)N.On top of that, if the monopolist
sells vintage B to old consumers in period 2 then he will get extra proﬁts π2 =( f(B) − f(A) − c)N. Total
proﬁts for this subgame are therefore given by
πAB =
 
(3f(B) − f(A)+N − 2c)N. if f(B) − f(A) >c (outcome {(A,B),(B,B)})
(2f(B)+N − c)N otherwise (outcome {(A,B),(A,B)}) (8)
To sustain this subgame, we need to make sure that new consumers do not want to buy vintage A and old
consumers do not want to buy (or trade-in) vintage B. Therefore prices satisfy the following conditions:
p1A > 2f(A)+3 N
p1B =2 f(B)+N
pt
1B > 2f(B) − 2f(A)
(9)
Note that at price p1B =2 f(B)+N, old consumers will not be willing to buy vintage B. If old consumers
keep vintage A they will get total utility equal to 2f(A)+2N in the two periods. Even if all consumers buy
vintage B in the ﬁrst period, that would give old consumers utility 2f(B)+2N−p1B = N over the two periods,
which is lower than keeping A. Therefore, this ﬁrst period price for B eﬀectively excludes old consumers from
buying that vintage. By the same argument, the trade in price for vintage B that prevents old consumers
buying it satisﬁes 2f(B)+2 N − pt
1B < 2f(A)+2 N. To prevent new consumers from buying vintage A we
have to make sure that even in the best scenario for vintage A (i.e. all consumers switching to A in period
1), new consumers prefer to coordinate on vintage B. This implies 0 = 2f(B)+N −p1B > 2f(A)+3N −p1A
which results in the price stated above.
4.2.3 Subgame (B,A):S e l lv i n t a g eB to old consumers and A to newcomers
In this subgame the monopolist sells the improved version of the durable (B) to old consumers and at the
same time he sells the old vintage to newcomers. The monopolist uses trade-in prices for old consumers to
13prevent arbitrage between groups. In the second period, the monopolist will also sell vintage B to the new
consumers if and only if
f(B) − f(A) >c (10)
and will not sell any vintage otherwise. By a similar argument as in the previous case, old consumers’ gross
surplus is not aﬀected whether or not newcomers decide to adopt vintage B in the second period, since the
externality associated with B will not change for period 2. The same is true for their opportunity cost of
giving up vintage A :i fevery old consumer keeps vintage A, he would get utility 2f(A)+3 N over two
periods. Therefore, they are willing to pay up to pt
1B =2 f(B) − 2f(A) − 2N.
Newcomers face a similar situation: If (10) is satisﬁed, then they know they will be induced to change
to vintage B in the second period. In the second period they can obtain a consumer surplus equal to
f(B)+N − pt
2B = f(A)+N. Therefore, in the ﬁrst period, they are willing to pay up to their consumer
surplus in the two periods: p1A =2 f(A)+2 N. If (10) is not satisﬁed, they will still use vintage A in the
second period, and will be willing to pay the same period-one price as before.
Combining the two types of consumers we get that ﬁrst period proﬁts for this subgame are:17
πBA =
 
(3f(B) − f(A) − 3c)N. if f(B) − f(A) >c (outcome {(B,A),(B,B)})
(2f(B) − 2c)N otherwise (outcome {(B,A),(B,A)}) (11)
Note that new consumers in any case get a net utility of zero after the two periods. In order to prevent new
consumers buying vintage B we need to set p1B high enough. In particular, if all new consumers were to
adopt vintage B together with the old consumers, they would get two period utility equal to 2f(B)+2 N.
Therefore, the regular price for vintage B has to make sure that new consumers get a higher utility buying
vintage A (zero in this case): 0 = 2f(A)+2N −p1A > 2f(B)+2N −p1B. Therefore, prices that induce this
subgame are:
p1A =2 f(A)+2 N
p1B > 2f(B)+2 N
pt
1B =2 f(B) − 2f(A) − 2N
(12)
In particular, new consumers interested in vintage B could purchase vintage A ﬁrst and immediately
trade it for vintage B at the prices set for old consumers. Following this strategy the total price they would
pay for vintage B is p1A+pt
1B =2 f(B). If every old consumer decides to pursue this double-buying strategy,
they would get utility 2f(B)+2N which is bigger than the price they are paying. We will therefore assume
that the monopolist can prevent this double-buying strategy (for example by selling vintage B before vintage
A is oﬀered in the market in period 1), and so can sustain subgame (B,A)i fh es ow i s h e s . 18
4.2.4 Subgame (B,B): Immediate switch to vintage B
The monopolist sells vintage B to all consumers in the ﬁrst period. As in the ﬁrst case, the monopolist can
price-discriminate in the ﬁrst period but not in the second, as trade-in prices are of no use then (everyone has
17Note that newc onsumers in any case get a net utility of zero after the two periods. We are implicitly assuming that the
monopolist can diﬀerentiate between old and newc onsumers when setting trade-in prices for the former. In particular, new
consumers interested in vintage B could purchase vintage A ﬁrst and immediately trade it for vintage B at the prices set for
old consumers. Following this strategy the total pricet h e ywould pay for vintage B is 2f(B). Ifa l lo l dconsumers decide to
pursue this arbitrage strategy, they would get utility 2f(B) +2 N whichi sbigger than the price they are paying.
This means that if the monopolist cannot prevent newc onsumers from buying twicei np e r i o d1 ,h ewill not bea ble to sustain
outcome (B,A) in the ﬁrst period. Howeve r ,t h i sd o e sn o tchange the results in this paper, since we will see later that the
monopolist will never want to induces u bgame (B,A)e ven if he can prevent arbitrage from newc onsumers.
18If the monopolist cannot prevent newc onsumers buying twicei np e r i o d1 ,h ewill not bea ble to sustain outcome (B,A)i n
the ﬁrst period. However, this does not change the results in this paper, since we will see later that the monopolist will never
want to induces u bgame (B,A)e ven if he can prevent the double-buying strategy from newc onsumers.
14the same good to be traded). There is no proﬁtability in selling again the old vintage in the second period,
and therefore consumers know they will keep their new vintage for two periods. However, old consumers
have a higher opportunity cost than new consumers, since they could all continue using vintage A and get
two-period utility of 2f(A)+2N.Therefore, the monopolist will use trade in prices:19 pt
1B =2 f(B)−2f(A) <
p1B =2 f(B)+2 N. Total proﬁts for this subgame are equal to
πBB =( 4 f(B) − 2f(A)+2 N − 2c)N (outcome {(B,B),(B,B)}) (13)
Note that, if new consumers were to acquire vintage A and old consumers keep vintage A, then new consumers
would get total utility 2f(A)+3 N. To discourage new consumers buying vintage A (and therefore, also
discouraging old consumers from keeping vintage A)w en e e dt os e tp1A > 2f(A)+3 N. Therefore, prices
that induce this subgame are:
p1A > 2f(A)+3 N
p1B =2 f(B)+2 N
pt
1B =2 f(B) − 2f(A)
(14)
4.2.5 Subgame (A,Ø):N os a l ei nﬁ r s tp e r i o d
In this subgame the monopolist waits during the ﬁrst period and only introduces the durable good again in
the second. Therefore, total proﬁts will depend on which of the four options with non-negative proﬁts for
the second period is more proﬁtable.





(f(A)+N − c)N if f(B) − f(A) <N (outcome {(A,Ø),(A,A)})
(f(B) − c)N if N<f (B) − f(A) <N+ c (outcome {(A,Ø),(A,B)})
(2f(B) − f(A) − N − 2c)N if N + c<f(B) − f(A) (outcome {(A,Ø),(B,B)})
(15)
To induce this subgame, the monopolist would need to set prices p1A,p 1B and pt
1B high enough. In particular,
to prevent new consumers buying vintage A, it will need to set prices higher than2f(A)+3 N, which is new
consumer’s utility if everyone has vintage A in period 1. To prevent that new consumers buy vintage B then
it is enough to set prices for vintage B higher than the best scenario for that vintage, which is both groups
adopting it in period 1. New consumers would increase their utility by 2f(B)+2 N, whereas old consumers
19If every old consumer decides to keep his old vintage A, then he gets a total utility in the twop e r i o d se qual to 2f(A)+2N,
whichi se x a ctly the maximum amount a newc onsumer would be willing to pay for vintage A (if all of them decide to buy A
secondhand). There is no possibility of arbitrage in this case if we assume that trading-in vintage B for A implies returning A
to the monopolist. Another interpretation is that old consumers are oﬀered just an upgrade that converts A into B, whereas
newc onsumers are given the whole good with the characteristicso fB.
15would increase their utility by 2f(B) − 2f(A). Accordingly, prices that sustain this subgame are:20
p1A > 2f(A)+3 N
p1B > 2f(B)+2 N
pt
1B > 2f(B) − 2f(A)
(16)
4.2.6 Subgame (B,Ø):S e l lB only to old consumers
The monopolist only sells vintage B to old consumers and denies it to newcomers, for example by only
allowing trading vintage B for A in the ﬁrst period.21 In the second period, the monopolist will sell vintage
B also to new consumers. In the ﬁrst period, old consumers will be willing to pay up to pt
1B =2 f(B) −
2f(A)−N which represents the gross surplus from using vintage B for two periods minus what they forgive
by abandoning vintage A. Total proﬁts for this subgame are therefore equal to
πBØ =( 3 f(B) − 2f(A) − 2c)N (outcome {(B,Ø),(B,B)}) (17)
To induce this subgame, the monopolist needs to ensure that new consumers will not buy any model. If all
consumers (new and old) use vintage A in period 1, then new consumers would get utility 2f(A)+3N. Thus
the monopolist needs to set a regular price for vintage A higher than that. If new consumers buy vintage
B, they would get utility 2f(B)+2 N, so the regular price for vintage B also has to be higher than that.
Therefore, prices necessary to induce this subgame are:
p1A > 2f(A)+3 N
p1B > 2f(B)+2 N
pt
1B =2 f(B) − 2f(A) − N
(18)
4.3 Partial, Full or No Introduction of a new vintage
Since the monopolist can, by his choice of prices in the ﬁrst period, induce any of the six subgames we
analyzed before, we can think of him choosing which subgame he wants to play in the ﬁrst period. Looking
at the total proﬁts associated with each particular subgame in the previous subsection, we can easily see that
a monopolist would never pursue subgames (A,Ø),(B,Ø) or (B,A), since it is more proﬁtable to introduce
the new vintage (B) to all consumers in the market in the ﬁrst period (subgame (B,B)). The intuition for
this dominance in the ﬁrst two cases is clear: the monopolist gains nothing by delaying the adoption of any
20Note that these prices for vintage B are just suﬃcient to sustain this subgame. But lower prices may also work. In
particular, one could set the following prices:
p1A > 2f(A) + 3N
p1B > 2f(B) +2 N
pt
1B > 2f(B) − 2f(A) − N
These prices ensure that newc onsumers will never buy vintage B (not even if old consumers buy it). Old consumers, aware of
this, know that they won’t bef o l l o wed in case they all adopt vintage B. Adopting b therefore gives them utility 2f(B) + N,
whereas keeping vintage A would bring them utility 2f(A) +2 N.T h ep r i ce pt
1B chosen abovem a kes sure old consumers don’t
want to switch.
The same reasoning can be applied nowb ys witching old and newc onsumers. Suppose noww em a ke sure that pt
1B is high
enough that old consumers never switcht oB (even if newc onsumers follow suit). newc onsumers, awa r eo ft h i s ,n e e dn o w a
lower pricet obe discourage from buying vintage B. These prices are:
p1A > 2f(A) + 3N
p1B > 2f(B) + N
pt
1B > 2f(B) − 2f(A)
21As in the subgame (B,B) there is no possibility of arbitrage betwe e no l da n dn e wc onsumers if trading-in vintage A requires
returning the good to the monopolist. Alternatively we can again think that the monopolist only sells an upgrade to A that
transforms it into B.
16vintage by the newcomers, since he can sell any of the two vintages above marginal cost in that period. In
the last case (subgame (B,A), the monopolist knows that he will be able to extract all consumer surplus
from both types of consumers, and so he doesn’t want to reduce it by forcing old consumers to buy the new
product while oﬀering the old vintage to newcomers. He could get the same distribution of use of vintages
A and B (and thus the same eﬀect on willingness to pay) by pursuing subgame (A,B) with the obvious cost
saving of not having to force old consumers to buy twice.
We are left with subgames (A,A), (A,B)a n d( B,B). By further examination of the payoﬀ associated
with the ﬁrst two, we can conclude that the outcome {(B,B),(B,B)} dominates both {(A,A),(B,B)} and
{(A,B),(B,B)}. The intuition for this is also straightforward: the size of the network in period 1 determines
the surplus generated in the second period, which the monopolist can extract by his choice of prices. The
monopolist is interested in building up a sizeable network (be it in vintage A or B) as soon as possible. Thus
if the monopolist is going to arrive to period two with a network of size 2N for vintage B, he might as well
build it from period 1 and have time for the externality to be fully developed in period 2. In this way, he
will be able to extract that increased surplus by the appropriate choice of prices in period 1.
Therefore, the only undominated outcomes are {(A,A),(A,A)}, {(A,B),(A,B)} and {(B,B),(B,B)}.
By looking at the extent to which the new vintage (B) is introduced in the market, we will call them the no
introduction (NI), partial introduction (PI)22 and full introduction (FI) outcomes, respectively.
Let γ ≡ f(B) − f(A) > 0 be the intrinsic diﬀerence in utility provided by the two vintages of the durable
good. We can also interpret γ as the degree of improvement of the new vintage over the existing one. Which
type of outcome arises in equilibrium depends on the relationship between γ, the marginal cost of production
c, and the size of the (potential) network 2N.
To summarize, the monopolist will maximize proﬁts by inducing the equilibrium outcomes speciﬁed in
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assuming that consumers coordinate on their Pareto-preferred strategy in the ﬁrst period,
the equilibrium outcome in the monopoly case is:





with price p1A =2 f(A)+3 N>c
and total proﬁts πAA =( 2 f(A)+3 N − c)N
2. {(A,B),(A,B)} [Partial Introduction (PI)]: if N<γ≡ f(B) − f(A) < c−N
2
with price p1B =2 f(B)+N>c
and total proﬁts πAB =( 2 f(B)+N − c)N





<γ≡ f(B) − f(A)
with prices pt
1B =2 f(B) − 2f(A) and p1B =2 f(B)+2 N>c
and total proﬁts πBB =( 4 f(B) − 2f(A)+3 N − 2c)N
Proof. The previous analysis showed that the three outcomes are the only ones that do not yield
lower proﬁts than the {(B,B),(B,B)} outcome. The bounds for each outcome arise from straightforward
manipulation of (5), (8) and (13). Prices and proﬁts are computed in the previous subsections.
22Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) call this the “leapfrogging”c ase, as newc onsumers, who started without any good, end up in
equilibrium adopting an improved version of the product, whereas old consumers keep their old vintage.
17c  ÅÅÅÅ  Å 
3 




c  ÅÅÅÅ  Å 
3 















Figure 2: Monopolist and lagged externalities: equilibrium outcome
18The results of the proposition are reproduced in ﬁgure 2, where the full introduction equilibrium includes
also the shaded area. We can distinguish two diﬀerent regimes depending on the size of the market relative
to marginal costs. In all these cases the issue is the same: in order to introduce the new vintage to old
consumers, the monopolist has to compensate them for the loss of the network they already enjoy by using
vintage A. That can be done either by oﬀering a new vintage B that increases their stand-alone utility (a
high value of γ) or by promising that they will enjoy a bigger network with B. In order to convince new
consumers to buy vintage B the monopolist also has to oﬀer the same advantages, although the task is easier
than with old consumers, since they are not locked-in with an existing network. Newcomers are easier to
convince to adopt B than old consumers, since the former have a lower reservation utility. That makes it
possible to sustain the partial introduction equilibrium {(A,B),(A,B)}.
4.3.1 Case I: Small market size N<c
3
If production costs are high relative to the size of the market (and therefore the strength of network exter-
nalities), then depending on the stand-alone utility diﬀerential γ between the two vintages one of the tree
types of equilibrium outcomes will arise: no introduction (NI), partial introduction (PI) or full introduction
(FI). If the utility diﬀerential is low (γ<N ), then the monopolist prefers not to introduce the new vintage
in the market, since it cannot compensate old consumers for the loss of their established network in good A.
If, on the other hand, the utility diﬀerential is high (γ>c−N
2 ) then the monopolist can induce old and new
consumers to adopt B, since the diﬀerential will compensate the production costs of providing the good for
2N consumers.
Partial introduction of the new vintage B can also be sustained as an equilibrium if the productivity
diﬀerential lies between these two extremes (N<γ<c−N
2 ). In this case the utility diﬀerential is not big
enough to induce old consumers to give up their established network. Also, network eﬀects are not very
strong, so even if all consumers move to the new vintage B, the remaining consumer will prefer to keep
vintage A. However, new consumers are not “locked” into any network yet, so they can get a higher beneﬁt
by adopting the newest technology. The basic intuition here is the same as in Ruiz (1997): old consumers
have an incentive to delay the timing of their adoption of a new vintage because externalities take one period
to “set in” and one period to disappear.
4.3.2 Case II: Big market size: N>c
4
If the size of the potential network is big compared with the marginal cost of production of the good, then we
have complete networks as the only possible type of equilibria in this game. If the utility gain γ brought up
by the new vintage B is small (even though it is positive), then the monopolist will induce all consumers to
end up with the old vintage A, since he can charge a high price for the network eﬀect. On the other hand, if
vintage B represents a suﬃciently big improvement (γ>c+N
4 ), then the monopolist will induce a complete
switch to the new vintage. In this case consumers’ willingness to pay for the advanced vintage compensates
the cost of losing the externality eﬀect in vintage A for one period.
Notice that in the full introduction (FI) equilibrium, the monopolist uses trade-in prices, oﬀering a
discount equal to f(A)+N to old consumers when they trade in vintage B for A. Actually, for some
parameters, the monopolist actually sells the new vintage B to old consumers at a price below marginal
cost:23
23Notice, however, that total proﬁts are still positive, since f(B) >f(A) >c .





<γ≡ f(B) − f(A) < c
2 then in equilibrium the monopolist introduces the
new vintage B to all consumers and uses trade-in prices below marginal cost: pt
1B <c<p 1B
Proof. Direct consequence of proposition 2.
Note that in the case described in the lemma, the monopolist is willing to make a loss in old consumers in
order to increase the value of the network B, and therefore extract a higher price from new consumers. The
shaded area in ﬁgure 2 represents the values of γ and N for which the monopolist uses trade-in prices below
marginal cost in period 1. This eﬀect of introductory prices below marginal costs is a recurrent feature in
many industries (think, for example, of free updates policies for some software, especially antivirus programs).
However, as we show in the appendix, a model with contemporaneous network externalities never generates
prices below marginal cost.
5 Eﬃciency properties of the equilibrium outcome
In order to assess whether the market solution exhibits planned obsolescence or too much delay in adopting
the improved version of the good, we need to derive the social optimum for this case. Suppose that we have
a planner interested in maximizing social welfare S, deﬁned as gross consumer surplus minus production
costs.
As in the monopolist’s problem, there are six possible outcomes in the ﬁrst period. However, since we
have assumed in (1) that the stand-alone utility of any vintage of the good is higher than the marginal cost
of production, then we can discard as socially suboptimal the ﬁrst period outcomes (A,∅)a n d( B,∅). The
planner could, in these cases, allocate any vintage to new consumers in the ﬁrst period and increase social
welfare since f(B) >f(A) >c .
For the rest of possible histories in the ﬁrst period, there are four possible outcomes in the second period.
Total surplus S associated with each particular option is given by table 4.24
After comparing social surplus for each possible outcome we can obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 4 For given values of γ, N and c, the socially optimal outcome is






2. {(A,B),(A,B)} [Partial Introduction (PI)]: if 3N
2 <γ≡ f(B) − f(A) < c−N
2






<γ≡ f(B) − f(A)
Proof. Note from table 4 that the full introduction (FI) outcome {(B,B),(B,B)} yields a higher surplus
than any other outcome except for the no introduction (NI) and the partial introduction (PI) outcomes.
The bounds in the lemma are obtained by direct comparison of the surplus found for each of these three
cases.
Graph 3 depicts the bounds for the three possible outcomes in the planner’s choice of introduction of
a new vintage. We should compare these bounds with those of the monopoly outcome in the previous




































S =( 4 f(A)+6 N − c)N
S =( f(B)+3 f(A)+4 N − 2c)N
S =( f(B)+3 f(A)+4 N − 2c)N
S =( 2 f(B)+2 f(A)+2 N − 3c)N
(A,B)
(A,A)
(A,B)[ P I ]
(B,A)
(B,B)
S =( f(B)+3 f(A)+3 N − 2c)N
S =( 2 f(B)+2 f(A)+3 N − c)N
S =( 2 f(B)+2 f(A)+3 N − 3c)N






S =( f(B)+3 f(A)+3 N − 3c)N
S =( 2 f(B)+2 f(A)+3 N − 4c)N
S =( 2 f(B)+2 f(A)+3 N − 2c)N





(B,B)[ F I ]
S =( 2 f(B)+2 f(A) − 4c)N
S =( 3 f(B)+f(A)+2 N − 3c)N
S =( 3 f(B)+f(A)+2 N − 3c)N
S =( 4 f(B)+4 N − 2c)N
Table 4: Total surplus per outcome
section. In order to ﬁnd out if there is planned obsolescence in this context, then we should examine what
happens with old and new consumers. We will deﬁne planned obsolescence as a situation in which the social
optimum involves a consumer keeping (or buying) model A, and yet the monopolist is able in equilibrium
to induce them to buy vintage B in period 125. Following Waldman (1993), we will deﬁne two types of
obsolescence. If only new consumers are induced to buy vintage B when they should acquire A, but old
consumers (eﬃciently) keep vintage A then we have a case of “weak obsolescence.” On the other hand,
if both types of consumers are induced to switch to B when they should use A, then we have a case of
“strong obsolescence.”26 The following proposition summarizes the type of ineﬃciency found in the case of
a monopolist with lagged externalities.
Proposition 5 (Monopolist and Planned Obsolescence) In equilibrium, there is planned obsolescence
for some combinations of γ and N. In some cases, old consumers are induced to switch to vintage B when
they should keep vintage A (“strong obsolescence”). In other cases, new consumers are induced to buy vintage
B when they should be buying vintage A instead (“weak obsolescence”)
Proof. Immediate from comparison of graphs 3 and 2. See graph 4.
The statement of the proposition can be seen graphically in ﬁgure 4 where the marked regions represent
the combinations of γ and N that would imply an equilibrium outcome diﬀerent from the social optimum.
The intuition of the proposition is the following: old consumers have an incentive to delay adoption of a new
vintage because externalities are lagging, and therefore, they can enjoy the network eﬀect for one period even
after every other consumer has switched to a new vintage. Therefore, no single consumer wants to “move
ﬁrst”, and that would result in ineﬃcient delay in switching to the new vintage B in cases where it would
be socially optimal for them to do so. However, this is true if prices for vintage B are held constant between
periods 1 and 2. However, the monopolist is able to price discriminate not only intratemporally, but also
intertemporally. If a consumer decides to wait and let others adopt vintage B in period 1, then when period
25Notice that both in the market outcome and the social optimum consumers only switch to model B in period 1, since
switching only in period 2 is not an equilibrium in the former and suboptimal in the latter.
26Notice that, in equilibrium, it will never be the case that old consumers switch to vintage B and new consumers buy vintage



















Figure 4: Monopolist: Equilibrium (red) vs. socially optimal (black) outcomes.
232 comes, the monopolist will be able to extract all its consumer surplus by the appropriate choice of trade-in
prices. In some cases, the monopolist can even close the market of a particular vintage, by oﬀering suitable
regular or trade-in prices for the other vintage. Therefore, the monopolist can control and break consumer’s
inertia generated by lagged externalities by its control over prices in the second period. Summarizing, any
gains that consumers may generate by waiting in period 1 will be appropriated by the monopolist in period
2, and therefore that eliminates any incentive to delay adoption. Thus, only the monopolist’s incentive to
introduce new vintages too fast remains in place, and therefore planned obsolescence results.
This proposition, therefore, conﬁrms the robustness of results in Waldman (1993) and Choi (1994) to
the introduction of incentives for consumer’s inertia. In that respect, having lagged externalities does not
introduce a qualitative change of results from these papers.
Notice that there is nothing in the reasoning above that requires having cohorts of consumers of the same
size. The presence of lagged externalities provides all the incentives for old consumers to delay their adoption
of a new vintage of the durable good. However, the introduction of a new parameter into the model prevents
the graphical analysis performed for the case of equal sized cohorts. The following proposition, formalizes
this idea.27
Proposition 6 Suppose that there is a mass N1 of old consumers and N2 of new consumers. In equilibrium,
there is planned obsolescence for some combination of γ, N1.and N2. Depending on the parameters, planned
obsolescence can be of the “strong” or the “weak” type.
6 The eﬀect of copying
The previous result highlights the fact that even in the case where consumers have an incentive to wait, the
monopolist can manipulate prices in the second period to induce consumers to buy the good immediately.
Suppose, however, that monopoly rights are short lived, in the sense that there is a competitive industry
that can provide a copy of a new vintage one period after its appearance in the market. This particular
setup can be found, for example in Shleifer (1986). As a motivation, one can think of successive versions of
a software provided by the monopolist. Once the new version is introduced in the market, it is easy to ﬁnd
copied versions of it after some time.
Formally, suppose that a competitive fringe is able to supply each vintage at marginal cost c one period
after it has been introduced by the monopolist. In particular, in period 1, the competitive fringe can oﬀer
vintage A at marginal cost c (since it has been around since period 0) and in period 2 the same competitive
fringe can oﬀer vintage B at marginal cost if it has been sold by the monopolist in period 1.
The ﬁrst thing to notice is that the existence or not of the competitive fringe does not change the socially
optimal outcomes described in lemma 4 since marginal costs of production are the same irrespective of the
producer of the vintage. The only thing left to be analyzed is the equilibrium outcome in the presence of this
competitive fringe. Following a similar approach to the one used in section 4, one can derive the following
proposition.
Proposition 7 (Monopolist with copying competitive fringe) Suppose there is a competitive fringe
copying each vintage one period after its introduction. For given values of γ, N and c, and assuming that
27Proof of this proposition can be obtained from the author upon request.
24consumers coordinate on their Pareto-preferred strategy in the ﬁrst period, one of the following equilibrium
outcomes will arise:
1. If γ<c− 2N :






(b) {(A,B),(A,B)} [Partial Introduction (PI)]: if N<γ≡ f(B) − f(A) < c−3N
2






<γ≡ f(B) − f(A) <c− 2N
2. If c − 2N<γ<c:





(b) {(A,B),(A,B)} [Partial Introduction (PI)]: if c
2 < N
2 <γ≡ f(B) − f(A) <c
(c) {(B,B),(B,B)} [Full Introduction (FI)]:i fMax

c − 2N,N − c
2

<γ≡ f(B) − f(A) <cand
N<c
3. If c<γ<c+2 N :
(a) {(A,A),(A,A)} [No Introduction (NI)]:i fc<γ≡ f(B) − f(A) <N− c
(b) {(A,B),(B,B)} [Slow Diﬀusion (SD)]: if Max{N − c,c} <γ≡ f(B) − f(A) <N
(c) {(B,B),(B,B)} [Full Introduction (FI)]:i fMax{N,c} <γ≡ f(B) − f(A) < 2N + c
4.I fc +2 N<γ:
(a) {(B,B),(B,B)} [Full Introduction (FI)].
Proof. See Appendix B
The results of this proposition can be summarized in graph 5. Notice that the possible outcomes include
now the possibility that the new vintage may diﬀuse slowly across diﬀerent groups of consumers (outcome
{(A,B),(B,B)}). In this particular case, old consumers decide to wait in period 1 and not buy the new
vintage B. The monopolist ﬁnds it proﬁtable to sell vintage B to new consumers (vintage A can no longer
be sold by the monopolist since it has already been copied by the competitive fringe). In period 2, the
competitive fringe can sell vintage B to old consumers who are willing to pay up to f(B) − f(A)w h i c hf o r
that area is bigger than the marginal cost of providing the good. As in the previous case, for some parameter
values, the monopolist ﬁnds it optimal to oﬀer trade-in prices for the new vintage B below cost, in order
to increase the value of the network for new consumers and induce them to buy vintage B as well. That is
represented by the shaded area in ﬁgure 5 and expressed formally in the following lemma.







<γ≡ f(B) − f(A) <M i n {c−N
2 ,N} then in equilibrium the
monopolist introduces the new vintage B to all consumers and uses trade-in prices below marginal cost:
pt
1B <c<p 1B
Finally, in order to assess the eﬃciency properties of this market structure, we need to compare this
outcome with the social optimum found in lemma 4. We can deﬁne two types of ineﬃcient delay. The































Figure 5: Monopolist with competitive fringe: equilibrium outcome
26social optimum implies that the new vintage B should be adopted immediately: {(B,B),(B,B)}. Therefore,
there is an ineﬃciency in the sense that old consumers take too long to adopt the new vintage. This is the
inertia brought about by the lagging externality plus the onset of a reduction in price by the competitive
fringe. The second type of delay, which we call “strong delay,” involves no introduction in equilibrium
(outcome {(A,A),(A,A)}) whereas the social optimum involves immediate switch to vintage B (outcome
{(B,B),(B,B)}).
Direct comparison of the bounds in the equilibrium outcome and the social optimum yields the following
proposition, represented by ﬁgure 6. Note that the darkly shaded area represents the region where planned
obsolescence still occurs, whereas the faintly shadowed area represents areas where delay appears.
Proposition 9 (Obsolescence and delay with competitive fringe) If the monopolist faces a compet-
itive fringe that copies the durable good after one period, than, depending on the parameters of the model the
equilibrium outcome may involve planned obsolescence (weak or strong) or delay (weak or strong).
Notice that ineﬃcient delay appears mainly when the externality eﬀect N is strong and when the new
vintage B represents a signiﬁcant improvement over the existing vintage A. (i.e γ big). The intuition is
clear. Precisely if the new vintage B is a signiﬁcant improvement over the existing vintage, a planner would
like all consumers to switch to that vintage. However, if the externality eﬀect is strong enough (big N),
then consumers have a stronger incentive to let other consumers adopt the new vintage ﬁrst and develop the
externality associated with it. That is, consumer inertia is stronger for N big. The combination of these two
factors generates the no adoption of the new vintage when it would be socially optimal (ineﬃcient delay).
The following lemma (represented in ﬁgure 7) highlights the fact that ineﬃcient delay is the most important
feature in this type of market structure.
Lemma 10 If c =0and there is a competitive fringe copying the new vintage one period after its introduction
by the monopolist, then there is never planned obsolescence in equilibrium. For some parameter values, there
is ineﬃcient delay.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed in this paper a monopolist selling durable goods that exhibit lagging network externalities.
The main question we wanted to answer was whether we could still see planned obsolescence in this context,
given that now consumers have an incentive to delay the adoption of a new vintage of the durable good.
We have seen that the answer depends on how much can the monopolist’s property rights be maintained.
If the monopolist can retain monopoly power over the new vintages, then in can price discriminate both
intratemporally and intertemporally to break consumer’s inertia by the appropriate choice of prices in the
second period. However, if the monopolist faces a competitive fringe that can copy and sell the new version
of the good one period after its introduction, that we still have planned obsolescence for some parameter
values, but for others we see ineﬃcient delay emerging in equilibrium. The fact that we have incentive to
wait and non-increasing prices generates situations where the new vintage is not introduced (“strong delay”)
or is adopted too slowly (“weak delay”).
It is important to emphasize that the emergence of delay is not due solely to declining prices brought



























































Figure 7: Monopoly with copying competitive fringe: Equilibrium (red) vs. Socially optimal outcome (black)
for zero marginal costs (c = 0).
29literature, then we will still have planned obsolescence and no delay, as one can see in ﬁgure 8. Therefore,
key to the emergence of delay is the fact that lagged externalities generate the incentive on consumers to
free ride on other consumers adopting the new vintage ﬁrst.
This result has some important implications for antitrust policy: it is no longer true that we may have
to take care of a monopolist trying to introduce new versions too fast, but, depending on the timing of the
externalities, we may have to give incentives to old consumers to switch to a new standard to prevent some
ineﬃcient “lock-in” to an old technology. The same question applies for policies that subsidize the scrapping
of old consumer durables (e.g. subsidies for automobile replacement in France or Spain).
One possible interesting extension of this model would be to allow the monopolist to control the timing
of the externality. Notice that in this model, one of the reasons why a consumer may want to delay a
switch to a new vintage is the possibility of enjoying the externality associated with the old vintage even
one period after it has been discarded by everyone else. If the indirect network externality is derived from
a support industry and the monopolist can control it, then he may want to stop providing service to old
vintages at the moment it introduces a new one, thus reducing the incentives to delay. This suggests that
vertical integration may prove eﬃcient in markets with this type of externalities, although the possibility of
controlling the extent and timing of the externality seems less compelling in the case of learning eﬀects. We






















Figure 8: Monopolist with competitive fringe: Equilibrium (red) versus socially optimal outcome (black)
with contemporaneous externalities.
31Appendix
A The Case of Perfect Competition with lagging externalities
To illustrate the incentives of consumers to delay their switching to a new vintage, we can examine the case
of perfect competition with lagging externalities. Consider that there is a competitive industry supplying
vintage A and B at marginal cost c in periods 1 and 2. Obviously, since f(B) >f (A) >c ,then new
consumers always buy some vintage in period 1. Therefore, in period 2, we only have four possible histories.
We solve the equilibrium of this game by backward induction.
A.1 Period 2
In period 2, both vintages are sold at marginal cost c. If in period 1 both types of consumers used vintage
A (history (A,A)), then in period 2 a consumer would only switch to vintage B (outcome {(A,A),(B,B)})
if and only if
γ ≡ f(B) − f(A) > 2N + c
since vintage B has no externalities associated with it (has not been used in period 1) and vintage A
has an externality eﬀect of 2N in period 2. Both types of consumers get a surplus in period 2 equal to
f(A)+2 N + Max{γ − 2N − c,0}
If vintage B has been used by only one group in period 1 (history (A,B)o r( B,A)), then in period 2
both vintages enjoy the same externality eﬀect, and so a user of vintage A will switch to vintage B (outcome
{(A,B),(B,B)} or {(B,A),(B,B)}) if and only if
γ ≡ f(B) − f(A) >c
Notice that a consumer that uses vintage B in period 1 does not want to switch to vintage A in period 2
since f(B) >f(A) and both vintages have the same externality eﬀect in period 2. Consumers with vintage
A in period 1 get surplus in period 2 equal to f(A)+N + Max{γ − c,0}. Consumers with vintage B in
period 1 get surplus in period 2 equal to f(B)+N.
Finally, if both consumers used vintage B in period 1, then they will never want to switch to vintage A
in period 2, since f(B) >f(A) and on top of that, vintage B also enjoys a bigger externality eﬀect in period
2. Both types of consumers will get surplus in period 2 equal to f(B)+2 N.
In table 5 we summarize the surplus obtained in period 2 as a function of period 1’s outcome and the
vintage used in period 1 by that consumer. Notice that we are also considering cases in which an agent
deviates in period 1 from the speciﬁed outcome. Since each agent is inﬁnitesimal, we assume that such a
deviation does not change the externality eﬀect in period 2.
A.2 Equilibria in Period 1




Consumer Surplus in second period
user of vintage A in period 1 user of vintage B in period 1
(A,A) f(A)+2 N + Max{γ − 2N − c,0} f(B)+Max{2N − γ − c,0}
(A,B) f(A)+N + Max{γ − c,0} f(B)+N
(B,A) f(A)+N + Max{γ − c,0} f(B)+N
(B,B) f(A)+Max{γ +2 N − c,0} f(B)+2 N
Table 5: Perfect Competition and Lagging Externalities: Second period consumer surplus
A.2.1 Subgame (A,A):
If new consumers buy vintage A at marginal cost in period 1 and old consumers keep vintage A, then new
consumers would get utility 2f(A)+3 N − c + Max{γ − 2N − c,0} and old consumers get 2f(A)+3 N +
Max{γ − 2N − c,0}.
To check the range of values of γ and N for which this can be sustained as an equilibrium, we need to
check individual deviations by old or new consumers. Start with new consumers. If one of them deviates in
period 1 and buys vintage B, then he will get f(B)−c in period 1 and f(B)+Max{2N −γ−c,0} in period
2 (see table 5) for a total of 2f(B)−c+Max{2N −γ −c,0}. If an old consumer deviates and buys vintage
B in period 1 he will also get the same surplus. To prevent this deviation from new and old consumers we
need to satisfy, respectively
2f(A)+3 N − c + Max{γ − 2N − c,0} > 2f(B) − c + Max{2N − γ − c,0} (19)
2f(A)+3 N + Max{γ − 2N − c,0} > 2f(B) − c + Max{2N − γ − c,0} (20)
Notice that only condition (19) is binding, since, if new consumers do not want to deviate, then neither old
consumers, as they save the adoption cost c by keeping vintage A. Condition (19) is equivalent to




which constitutes the range of values of γ and N where equilibrium (A,A) is possible in the ﬁrst period.
A.2.2 Subgame (A,B):
If new consumers buy B while old consumers keep A, then new consumers would get utility in the two
periods equal to 2f(B)+N − c, while old consumers get utility 2f(A)+2 N + Max{γ − c,0}.
If a new consumer decides to deviate and buy vintage A in period 1, he would get utility f(A)+N −c+
Max{f(B)+N −c,f(A)+N} =2 f(A)+2N −c+Max{γ −c,0}. If an old consumer deviates in period 1
and buys B, he will get total utility 2f(B) − c + N. To ensure that (A,B) is an equilibrium outcome in the
ﬁrst period, we need to make sure these two deviations are not proﬁtable, that is












Intuitively, for the same price c and the same level of externality N (which aﬀects both vintages equally in
the second period) new consumers are more willing to buy the new technology than old consumers, since the
33latter have an outside option which is to keep their existing vintage A. Since new consumers need to buy in
period 1, they have a lower opportunity cost of buying B (lower in the amount c). Thus the equilibrium can
be sustained.
A.2.3 Subgame (B,A):
In this subgame, new consumers get utility in two periods equal to 2f(A)+2N −c+Max{γ−c,0},w h e r e a s
old consumers, who buy B, get total utility 2f(B)+N −c. If a new consumer deviates in period 1 and buys
B he will get utility 2f(B)+N − c. If an old consumer deviates and buys A in period 1, then he would get
utility 2f(A)+2 N + Max{γ − c,0}. To sustain (B,A) as an equilibrium we would need
2f(A)+2 N + Max{γ − c,0} < 2f(B)+N − c<2f(A)+2 N − c + Max{γ − c,0} (24)
which is clearly a contradiction for c>0. Therefore (B,A) cannot be sustained as an equilibrium. In words,
whenever a new consumer is willing to buy A and does not want to deviate and behave like an old consumer,
then obviously an old consumer, with lower opportunity cost of using A in period 1, would want to deviate
from the prescribed strategy in this subgame (i.e. using b in period 1).
A.2.4 Subgame (B,B):
If everyone switches to vintage B in period 1, then new and old consumers get utility 2f(B)+2 N − c. If a
new consumer deviates in period 1 and keeps vintage A, then he would get utility 2f(A)+N −c+Max{γ +
2N − c,0}. An old consumer trying the same deviation would get utility 2f(A)+N + Max{γ +2 N − c,0}
To ensure that these deviations are not proﬁtable, we need
2f(B)+2 N − c>2f(A)+N − c + Max{γ +2 N − c,0} (25)
2f(B)+2 N − c>2f(A)+N + Max{γ +2 N − c,0} (26)
Notice that only condition (26) is binding. That is, if we can ensure that old consumers, with a lower
opportunity cost of keeping A, do not want to deviate from buying B, then neither do new consumers.
Condition (26) can also be expressed as








Notice that given the three types of equilibria found above, there are ranges of values of γ and N for which
there will be multiple equilibria. In those cases, we select the Pareto optimal equilibrium assuming that
consumers can coordinate their choices in order to attain it. Table 6 summarizes the total utility attained
over the two periods by old and new consumers in each equilibrium. Notice that in equilibrium (A,A), old
or new consumers will never switch to vintage B in the second period for the range of γ for which that is
an equilibrium outcome. In general, in equilibrium, we will have that second-period outcomes will be the
same as ﬁrst period outcomes, except for equilibrium (A,B), where old consumers may decide to switch to
B only in period 2, after the externalities associated with that vintage have been developed.
For the ranges of values of γ for which there is the possibility of multiple equilibria, we select the Pareto
optimal one. In order to do that we just need to compare the utility obtained by each group in each of the
possible cases.
34Equilibrium Utility
First Period Range Old consumer New Consumer
(A,A) γ<M i n {N + c, 3N
2 } 2f(A)+3 N 2f(A)+3 N − c
(A,B) Max{N
2 ,N− c} <γ<Ma x {N, N
2 + c
2} 2f(A)+2 N + Max{γ − c,0} 2f(B)+N − c
(B,B) Max{c
2 − N
2 ,N} <γ 2f(B)+2 N − c 2f(B)+2 N − c
Table 6: Perfect Competition and Lagged Externalities: two-period utility in each equilibrium














From table 6, new consumers would prefer to coordinate on subgame (A,A) instead of (A,B)i f2 f(A)+
3N − c>2f(B)+N − c, that is
γ<N (28)











From table 6, old and new consumers would prefer to coordinate on subgame (A,A) instead of (B,B)i f






Therefore, equilibrium {(A,A),(A;A)} will be the unique equilibrium for γ<M i n {N
2 ,N−c} and the Pareto
preferred equilibrium for Min{N
2 ,N−c} <γ<N .Therefore, {(A,A),(A,A)} will be played in equilibrium
in the range γ<N
Equilibrium (A,B) : We have already seen that in the range Max{N




2 , (A,A)a n d( A,B) are two possible equilibrium outcomes in the ﬁrst period. Following the previous
analysis, (A,B) will be Pareto preferred on the part of this range where
γ>N














Using similar arguments, to sustain (A,B) as an equilibrium in the ﬁrst period we need to satisfy
2f(B)+N − c ≥ 2f(A)+3 N − c for new consumers and 2f(A)+2 N + Max{γ − c,0}≥2f(B)+2 N − c
for old consumers. That is








2 and the Pareto preferred equilibrium for Max{ c
2 − N
2 ,N} <γ< c
2. Therefore, {(A,B),(A,B)}





Monopolist’s second period prices






p2B = Max{f(B) − f(A) − 2N + c,c}
pt
2B = Max{f(B) − f(A) − 2N,c}
(A,A)i f f(B) − f(A) < 2N + c
(B,B)i f f(B) − f(A) > 2N + c
A,B p2A = pt
2A = p2B = pt
2B = c (A,B)i f f(B) − f(A) <c
(B,B)i f f(B) − f(A) >c
B,A p2A = pt
2A = p2B = pt
2B = c (B,A)i f f(B) − f(A) <c
(B,B)i f f(B) − f(A) >c
B,B p2A = pt
2A = p2B = pt
2B = c (B,B)
Table 7: Monopolist with competitive fringe: feasible actions in the second period and associated proﬁt-
maximizing prices
Equilibrium (B,B) : Finally, from the previous discussion, we can conclude that {(B,B),(B,B)} will be
played in the range γ>M a x {c
2,N}
We can summarize the previous results in the following






{(A,B),(A,B)} if N ≤ γ ≤ c
2
{(B,B),(B,B)} if γ>M a x {c
2,N}
B Proof of Proposition 7
To prove proposition 7, we need to start with period 2 and then solve backwards to period 1. Given that
in period 1 vintage A is sold at marginal cost by the competitive fringe and f(A) >c ,in equilibrium,
we will never observe histories {A,Ø} or {B,Ø} in the ﬁrst period, since a new consumer can always get
positive utility in period 1 buying vintage A at marginal cost, without aﬀecting his chances of getting any
other vintage in period 2. Therefore, we just concentrate on the other four possible histories in period 1:
{A,A},{A,B},{B,A} and {B,B}.
B.1 Period 2
Table 7 summarizes the possible histories and maximum prices paid by consumers in each of them. Notice
that since there is a competitive fringe copying each vintage one period after its introduction, in period 2,
vintage A is always sold at marginal cost and vintage B is also sold at marginal cost in any history where
vintage B has been introduced in period 1 (lines 2, 3 and 4 in table 7). In the case of histories where vintage
B was not introduced in period 1, the maximum price charged for vintage B has to take into account the
outside option of buying vintage A at marginal cost c. Given that, in period 1 vintage A is sold at marginal
cost by the competitive fringe and f(A) >c ,in equilibrium, we will never observe histories {A,Ø} or {B,Ø},
since a new consumer can always get positive utility in period 1 buying vintage A at marginal cost, without
aﬀecting his chances of getting any other vintage in period 2.
As in the case of the monopolist, in the second period we do not need to assume that consumers coordinate
36their behavior to obtain a unique equilibrium. Given that this is the last period, consumers still disregard
other consumer’s actions when deciding the adoption of a new vintage. This determines the outcome in the
second period as stated in the third column of table 7.
For histories {A,B}, {B,A} and {B,B}, where vintage B has been introduced already in period 1, the
monopolist cannot set prices above marginal cost in period 2 and therefore its second period proﬁts will
be π2 =0 . The only non-trivial decision for the monopolist is in the case of history {A,A}, where the
monopolist still retains monopoly rights over vintage B. The monopolist will choose to introduce vintage B
if and only if pt
2B = f(B) − f(A) − 2N>cin which case π2 = f(B) − f(A) − 2N − c.
B.2 Period 1
Due to the same problem of multiplicity of equilibria, we still need to select among the many equilibria in
period 1. We again assume that consumers can coordinate to choose their Pareto-optimal outcome. In this
ﬁrst period, vintage A is already supplied by the competitive fringe (it has been available since period 0) so
p1A = c.
B.2.1 Subgame (A,A):
The monopolist decides not to sell in the ﬁrst period. In the ﬁrst period new consumers buy vintage A
from the competitive fringe at marginal cost. in the second all consumers switch to vintage B if and only if
f(B) − f(A) > 2N + c. Total proﬁts for this subgame are therefore:
πAA =
 
(f(B) − f(A) − 2N − c)2N, if f(B) − f(A) > 2N + c (outcome {(A,A),(B,B)})
0i f f(B) − f(A) < 2N + c (outcome {(A,A),(A,A)})
In order to sustain this subgame in equilibrium, prices for vintage B need to be high enough to deter
purchases from either group. If all consumers decide to use vintage B in period 1, they would get total
utility over the two periods equal to 2f(B)+2 N. If old consumers keep vintage A they can get utility
2f(A)+2N.28 If pt
1B > 2f(B)−2f(A) then old consumers will never buy vintage B. If new consumers buy
vintage B instead of A, they would also get extra utility 2f(B)−p1B −(2f(A)−c), therefore, the following
prices ensure that even in the best scenario for vintage B (i.e. the expectation that everyone would buy B)
no consumer is willing to buy that vintage.
p1B > 2f(B) − 2f(A)+c
pt
1B > 2f(B) − 2f(A)
Notice that in this subgame there is no incentive to wait, since the monopolist is not introducing vintage B
in the ﬁrst period, as in the following subgames.
B.2.2 Subgame (A,B):
The monopolist only introduces vintage B to new consumers. Old consumers keep using vintage A.I nt h e
second period, all prices drop to marginal cost (see table 7) and old consumers switch to vintage B if and
only if f(B)−f(A) >c ,that is, if vintage B is suﬃciently better than vintage A to justify paying the price
c to switch.
28Notice that as in the case of the monopolist without a competitve fringe, in this subgame, if the monopolist sells vintage
B in the second period, then it will be able to extract all surplus from buyers.
37Notice that since the monopolist sells vintage B in period 1, it will become available at marginal cost in
period 2. Moreover, the externality eﬀect of vintage B will only develop in period 2, and this gives incentives
for consumers to deviate and let other consumers buy B in period 1, while they try to buy it only in period
2. This forces the monopolist to lower prices for vintage B in period 1 in order to be able to sell it.
In particular, by adopting vintage B in period 1, a new consumer would get total utility over the next
two periods equal to 2f(B)+N −p1B. On the other hand, if every new consumer buys vintage B in period
1, a new consumer could deviate and buy vintage A in period 1 and then buy vintage B only in period 2,
getting total surplus equal to f(B)+f(A)+2 N − 2c. Another deviation for a new consumer could be to
buy vintage A and keep it both periods, to get total utility 2f(A)+2N −c. Therefore, the price charged for
vintage B that prevents these individual deviations has to satisfy
p1B ≤ Min{f(B) − f(A) − N +2 c,2f(B) − 2f(A) − N + c} (31)
On the other hand, we also have to make sure that a coordinated deviation by all new consumers in
period 1 does not leave them with a higher utility. If all new consumers decide to buy vintage A at marginal
cost in period 1, in period 2 they can keep vintage A or switch to B in which case we would return to
subgame (A,A) and any extra surplus generated by a switch to B would be appropriated by the monopolist.
Therefore, they would get total utility of 2f(A)+3 N − c. The price charged for vintage B in period 1 has
to ensure that this deviation is not proﬁtable:
p1B ≤ 2f(B) − 2f(A) − 2N + c (32)
From (31) and (32) we obtain an upper bound on the regular price of vintage B in period 1:
p1B = Min{γ − N +2 c,2γ − 2N + c} = γ − N + c + Min{c,γ − N}
Notice in particular that the price for vintage B in this subgame is lower than in the equivalent subgame
when there is no competitive fringe (see eq. (9) in the main text).
If every old consumer switches to B in period 1, he would get total utility 2f(B)+2N minus the price it
pays for that vintage. Keeping vintage A they get 2f(A)+2 N + Max{γ − c,0} since in the second period
they have the option of buying vintage B if the productivity diﬀerence is higher than the price c of vintage
B in period 2. Thus, to discourage old consumers buying vintage B, we need to satisfy:
p1B > 2f(B) − 2f(A) − Max{γ − c,0} =2 γ − Max{γ − c,0} =2 γ + Min{γ,c}
pt
1B > 2f(B) − 2f(A) − Max{γ − c,0} =2 γ − Max{γ − c,0} =2 γ + Min{γ,c}
This, together with the previous condition for new consumers, implies that this subgame can only be induced
if γ − N + c + Min{c,γ − N} > 2γ + Min{γ,c}, that is if
2N + γ<c (33)
The monopolist does not make any sales above marginal cost in the second period. Actually, given condition
(33), old consumers will not be willing to buy vintage B in the second period from the competitive fringe,
and therefore the only outcome in this subgame is {(A,B),(A,B)}. Also, for that range, p1B = γ −N +c+
Min{c,γ − N} =2 γ − 2N + c Total proﬁts in this subgame are just proﬁts obtained in the ﬁrst period.
πAB =( p1B − c)N =( 2 γ − 2N)N, if 2N + γ<c
38B.2.3 Subgame (B,A):
The monopolist only introduces vintage B to old consumers. New consumers buy vintage A at marginal cost.
In the second period, as prices for all vintages drop to c, new consumers switch to vintage B if and only if
f(B)−f(A) >c(see table 7). Adopting vintage B in period 1 gives an old consumer utility 2f(B)+N−pt
1B.
On the other hand, a single old consumer can deviate and keep vintage A in the ﬁrst period and buy vintage
B only in the second period, getting total utility f(B)+f(A)+2N −c. Another option is to keep vintage A
both periods getting total utility 2f(A)+2N. Therefore, with these individual deviations, old consumers get
utility equal to 2f(A)+2N +Max{γ−c,0}. The trade-in price pt
1B that prevents these individual deviations
therefore has to satisfy
pt
1B ≤ 2f(B)+N − (2f(A)+2 N + Max{γ − c,0})
= Min{f(B) − f(A) − N + c,2f(B) − 2f(A) − N} (34)
We also need to check that old consumers do not want to coordinate on keeping vintage A in period 1. As
in the previous case, this coordinated deviation would return us to history (A,A) for period 2, where any
additional gain from switching will be appropriated by the monopolist. Therefore, old consumers would get
utility 2f(A)+3N by coordinately sticking to vintage A in period 1. The trade-in price charged for vintage
B has to ensure that this collective “deviation” is not proﬁtable:
pt
1B ≤ 2f(B) − 2f(A) − 2N (35)
From (34) and (35) we obtain an upper bound on pt
1B:
pt
1B ≤ γ − N + Min{c,γ − N} (36)
We also have to ensure that new consumers do not want to buy vintage B. If all of them get vintage B
in the ﬁrst period, then they would get utility 2f(B)+2N minus the price paid for B. Buying vintage A at
marginal cost they get utility 2f(A)+2N −c+Max{γ −c,0} since they have the option of buying vintage
B in the second period. Therefore, to prevent new consumers buying vintage B, we need:
p1B > 2f(B) − 2f(A)+c − Max{γ − c,0} =2 γ + c − Max{γ − c,0}
pt
1B > 2f(B) − 2f(A) − Max{γ − c,0} =2 γ − Max{γ − c,0}
where the condition on pt
1B takes into account that new consumers can also get vintage B by acquiring
vintage A at marginal cost and then trading it in for B at price pt
1B. From condition (36) on old consumers,
this results in pt
1B = γ −N +Min{c,γ −N} =2 γ −2N −Max{γ −c−N,0} > 2γ −Max{γ −c,0}, which
cannot be satisﬁed for non-negative values of N.
Therefore, subgame (B,A) cannot be induced in equilibrium: any price that makes old consumers willing
to buy vintage B in the ﬁrst period will also make new consumers willing to acquire it. The intuition is simple:
an old consumer has always the option of keeping A and that assures them a surplus of 2f(A)+2N+Max{γ−
c,0} when buying B. But notice that new consumers can also acquire B if they are willing to pay pt
1B + c,
that is, buying A ﬁrst and then exchanging it with B. If every new consumer does that, he would obtain a
surplus equal to 2f(B)+2N−pt
1B−c = f(B)+f(A)+3N−c−Min{c,γ} =2 f(A)+3N−c+Max{γ−c,0},
which is bigger than 2f(A)+2N −c+Max{γ−c,0}, the surplus obtained from buying vintage A. In words,
if every new consumer decides to buy vintage B then that increases the network eﬀect of vintage B, and so,
if old consumers were willing to switch, then new consumers would also be willing to switch after buying
vintage A in the ﬁrst period.
39B.2.4 Subgame (B,B):
In this subgame, the monopolist introduces vintage B to both consumers. Since new consumers can always
acquire vintage A at marginal cost and then exchange it to get B at the regular trade-in price, then p1B =
pt
1B + c. Old consumers would get utility 2f(B)+2 N − pt
1B and new consumers would get utility 2f(B)+
2N − p1B =2 f(B)+2 N − pt
1B − c.
In period 2, vintage B could be acquired at marginal cost. Therefore, an old consumer could wait one
period and switch to vintage B in period 2. That would give him utility f(B)+f(A)+3 N − c. If only one
old consumer decides to keep vintage A in both periods, he would get 2f(A)+N. Therefore, old consumers
are sure to obtain a surplus of 2f(A)+N +Max{γ −c+2N,0}. To prevent individual deviations from old
consumers, we need to satisfy
2f(B)+2 N − pt
1B > 2f(A)+N + Max{γ − c +2 N,0} (37)
.
On the other hand, if old consumers coordinate and use the same strategy, then, by keeping vintage A in
period 1, then each of them can get utility 2f(A)+2N +Max{γ−c,0}. Therefore, to sustain old consumers
willing to switch collectively, we also need to ensure that
2f(B)+2 N − pt
1B > 2f(A)+2 N + Max{γ − c,0} (38)
New consumers confront the same conditions (37) and (38). Even though they have to pay c if they want to
deviate and acquire A, they also have to pay a price higher than old consumers in exactly the same amount
c.
The last thing to check is that both type of consumers (old and new) do not want to coordinate and use
vintage A in the ﬁrst period. That would give old consumers a utility equal to f(A)+N in the ﬁrst period.
In the second period, as vintage B has not been sold, the monopolist would still retain his rights over that
vintage, and so consumers would be extracted any additional surplus from switching to B (see ﬁrst line of
table 7). Therefore, total utility from buying vintage A in period 1 would be 2f(A)+3 N. To ensure that
this deviation is not proﬁtable, we need to satisfy
2f(B)+2 N − pt
1B > 2f(A)+3 N (39)
Combining (37), (38) and (39) we have:
pt
1B = p1B − c
=2 f(B) − 2f(A)+2 N − Max{γ − c +3 N,3N}
=2 γ − N − Max{γ − c,0}
= γ − N + Min{γ,c}
Total proﬁts for this subgame are
πBB =( pt
1B − c)N +( p1B − c)N
=[ 2 ( γ − N + Min{γ,c}) − c]N
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